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Introduction

This book is a sequel to Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Under
standing (Lacey 1999/2004; hereafter referred to as SVF). I introduced in SVF a
general model of the interplay of science and values that enables us to identify
clearly the ways in which values legitimately play a role in scientific practices
and the ways in which they do not. I was interested, however, not only in the im
pact of values on scientific methodology, but also (though this was much less de
veloped) in how scientific practices and results may have impact in the realm of
values, in how, for example, science may have implications for and contribute to
the quest for social justice and human well-being. In this present book, the ques
tion of how to conduct scientific practices for the sake of furthering human well
being informs the overall argument.
Part I does deal with questions of scientific methodology. It strengthens some
of the arguments made in SVF, draws new consequences that flow from the gen
eral framework concerning how scientific results are to be interpreted, argues for
the methodological importance of applied science, and deepens arguments in fa
vor of methodological pluralism by bringing to the forefront questions that must
be addressed in order to legitimate applications of scientific knowledge—all so
as to show that the quest for objectivity in science is not incompatible with con
ducting science for the sake of furthering human well-being. Then, in part II, I
bring the analysis of methodology developed in part I to bear on a current con
troversy with far-reaching ethical and social implications: whether transgenic
crops should be used widely and, if not, what forms of farming provide suitable
alternatives to using them. Through drawing on this analysis, we gain a rich un
derstanding of the scientific, ethical, and political dimensions of the controversy
and of how the dimensions interact with one another. At the same time, all the
themes of part I are illustrated, especially as they concern the conduct and insti
tutionalization of scientific practices. Throughout part I, I anticipate various fea1
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tines of the discussion to follow in part II, introducing them where convenient
from chapter to chapter, in order to illustrate, to stimulate, and to give concrete
texture to the general philosophy of science being developed; and also in order
to be in a position to make soundly based recommendations about how to re
spond to the controversy.
The analysis of the transgenics controversy, in the light of my general model
of the interplay of science and values, is the most distinctive feature of this book,
and it is intended to have impact on public discussion. But the argument of the
book will not be dated when the controversy no longer captures attention, for
that is not what the book principally is about. It is about my model of the inter
action of values and scientific practices, and about making sense of science as a
historical and social phenomenon. It is a test of the explanatory power and sig
nificance of my model that it makes sense of the actual historical outcome of the
transgenics controversy, whatever it may be. Another, ultimately more impor
tant, test is whether the analysis can be generalized to make sense of a wide
range of scientific developments and controversies, and whether some of the al
ternative kinds of scientific practices to which the analysis points can be devel
oped into nourishing areas of research and practice.

SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF
IS SCIENCE VALUE FREE?
The principal theme of SVF, as its title makes apparent, is the analysis and crit
ical appraisal of the widely held view that science is value free. In order to lo
cate the contribution of this book, it will be helpful to recall the central theoret
ical concepts and to .state the most important conclusions of the earlier book. I
will do this by presenting a list of the principal theses that were defended in it.
Tliesis 1; The idea that science is value free is best understood as a combination of
claims about three key aspects of scientific practices—the acceptance of theories and
the knowledge claims that are represented in them, the consequences of applying sci
entific knowledge, and scientific methodology—that I call respectively: impartiality,
neutrality, and autonomy; it is well captured by the thesis; impartiality, neutrality, and
autonomy are constitutive values of scientific practices and institutions—where,
among other things, impartiality presupposes that there is a distinction between cog
nitive and social (ethical and other kinds of non-cognitive) values, and neutrality pre
supposes that scientific theories have no value judgments among their logical impli
cations.
This thesis, and the presuppositions of impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy,
will be re-articulated in a sharper and more elegant manner in chapter 1 of this
book.
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After extensive argument, I concluded;
Thesis 2: Only impartiality can be unambiguously upheld. It expresses the value:
to accept a theory of a domain of phenomena if and only if it manifests the cogni
tive values to a suitably high degree in the light of relevant available empirical data,
and to reject a theory if and only if it is inconsistent with a soundly accepted the
ory; hence there is no proper role for ethical and social values, alongside the cog
nitive values, in making judgments of theory acceptance. In contrast, autonomy is
not a realizable value; and neutrality—that, overall and in principle, the application
of scientific knowledge serves value-outlooks evenhandedly—is compromised
within mainstream scientific practices, but could be more fully manifested if scien
tific research were conducted under a suitable plurality of methodological ap
proaches.
The key to my argument lay in introducing, as an element in the analysis of
scientific methodology, in addition to “theory” (hypothesis) and “empirical
data,” what I call a “strategy”;
Thesis 3: (a) Scientific research is always conducted under a strategy, whose main
roles are, first, to prescribe constraints on the kinds of theories (and the kinds of cat
egories they may deploy) that may be entertained and investigated, and thus to
specify the kinds of possibilities that may be identified in the course of the research,
and, second, to select the relevant kinds of empirical data to seek out and report,
and the phenomena and aspects of them that are to be observed and experimented
upon, (b) The aim of science permits that successful research may be conducted un
der a variety of kinds of strategies.
But:
Thesis 4: Modern scientific research has been conducted almost exclusively under
particular kinds, of strategies (albeit a considerable variety of them), those I call
“materialist strategies,” under which theories are constrained to those that represent
phenomena and encapsulate possibilities in terms of their being generable from un
derlying structure (and its components), process, interaction, and the laws (charac
teristically expressed mathematically) that govern them; and, by virtue of obtaining
them as products of measurement, instrumental, and experimental operations, em
pirical data are generally quantitative.
Representing phenomena under materialist strategies decontextualizes them, by
dissociating them from any place they may have in relation to social arrange
ments, human lives and experience, from any link with value, and from what
ever social, human, and ecological frameworks in which they may be embedded.
In this book, I call the kinds of possibilities that can be encapsulated under ma
terialist strategies “decontextualized possibilities” (or, as I called them in SVF,
“material possibilities”). In order to illustrate that not all possibilities that may
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be identified in systematic empirical inquiry (whose results accord with impar
tiality) are reducible to decontextualized possibilities, I used the examples of
human agency and agroecology. Research conducted on human and agroecologica! phenomena under respectively “feminist strategies” {SVF, chapter 9) and
“agroecological strategies” (chapter 8) has produced knowledge in accordance
with impartiality, but under these strategies phenomena are not dissociated from
their human/social/ecological contexts, and so the possibilities that are identified
for them are not decontextualized.
Thesis 5: Scientific research—systematic empirical inquiry that produces results
that are in accordance with impartiality—may be conducted (for some domains of
phenomena) under strategies that, while they may freely utilize results consolidated
under materialist strategies, are not reducible to materialist strategies.

Thesis 5, backed by the illustrations, confirms that including (b) in Thesis 3 is
not merely an abstract logical point.
Theses 4 and 5, then, lead us to pose the questions; How do we explain the
fact that modern scientific research has been conducted almost exclusively un
der materialist strategies? And: Are there good reasons for conducting research
in this way? After considering and rejecting a variety of answers that have been
put forward, 1 concluded:
Thesis 6: (a) The almost exclusive adoption of materialist strategies in modern sci
ence is explained (i) by their fruitfulness and potential for practically unlimited fur
ther development, (ii) by the fact that there are mutually reinforcing relations be
tween adopting them and holding a set of social values, specifically the modem
valuation of control, and (iii) by the fact that the modem valuation of control is
widely upheld throughout advanced industrial countries and highly embodied in
their leading institutions, (b) There are good reasons for the privilege that materi
alist strategies have gained only to the extent that there are good reasons to uphold
the modern valuation of control.

The modern valuation of control refers to a set of specifically modern values
connected with the control of natural objects, having to do with expanding the
scope of technological control, its value not being systematically subordinated
to that of other ethical and social values, and the degree of its penetration into
modern lives, experience, and institutions. It and its presuppositions are dis
cussed more fully in section 1.1. It does not follow from this thesis that materi
alist strategies are always adopted because of an interest to further the modern
valuation of control, or that movement from one kind of materialist strategies to
another can be explained by reference to these social values. Thesis 6 concerns
the almost exclusive adoption of materialist strategies in modem science, and it
relates this to particular social values being widely upheld. Item (b) is crucial.
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Where the modem valuation of control is contested, there can be no objection
(in principle) to adopting strategies in research in virtue of their mutually rein
forcing relations with other values (subject, of course, to providing reasons to
uphold these values). Then, we can see Thesis 6 to be a particular case of the
more general:
Thesis 7: Social values may provide a compelling reason to adopt a particular kind
of strategy: adopt strategies in view of mutually reinforcing relations that adopting
them may have with holding specific social values. In practice, this may mean:
adopt strategies under which valued kinds of possibilities (if there are any) can be
systematically identified and the means for realizing them discovered, or that have
the potential to produce results that, on application, can further the interests defined
by the values—subject always to the conditions of (i) fruitfulness, (ii) the results
gained being in accord with impartiality, and (iii) the recognition that it is not evi
dence against the genuineness of a possibility that it cannot be identified under a
favored strategy.

Feminist values may provide a good reason to adopt “feminist strategies,” and
the values of “popular participation,” widely held values within movements of
small-scale farmers and rural workers in many of the impoverished regions of
the world, may provide a good reason to adopt “agroecological strategies” (see
section 5.4 and part II of this book). Thesis 7 goes hand in hand with:
Thesis 8: The moment of deciding to adopt a strategy may be logically separated
from that of choice to accept or reject a theory (of a specified domain of phenom
ena) constructed under the strategy, so much so that commitment to impartiality can
be maintained at the latter moment, even though social values may have a legiti
mate role at the first moment. Moreover, the social values in play at the first mo
ment may be the same values whose furtherance is served at a third moment, that
of the application of scientific knowledge.

Theses 7 and 8 together sum up the general model of the interplay of science and
values that I referred to at the outset.
Research conducted under one kind of strategy may complement that con
ducted under another by, for example, exploring possibilities of things that can
not be considered because of the constraints of the other. But strategies may also
compete (e.g., for resources), and this may make it socially impossible for re
search to be conducted simultaneously and in a probing way under conflicting
strategies. Thus, if one kind of strategies is privileged because of its links with
predominant social values, this may lead to inability even to recognize that there
is a choice of strategy to make. Specifically:
Thesis 9: So strong is the grip of materialist strategies in modern science that it
is often not appreciated that there may be certain domains of phenomena (e.g..
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agriculture), which are of special salience where the modern valuation of control
is contested, but whose possibilities cannot be adequately encapsulated in theo
ries confirmed in research conducted under materialist strategies, although they
can be under other kinds of strategies (e.g., agroecological strategies).

With this in mind, I introduced:
Thesis 10: The aim of science is best served by institutionalizing scientific practices
so that a plurality of strategies, linked respectively with different social values, may
be actively pursued. This would also make possible the fuller manifestation of neu
trality and giving better attention to value issues raised by applications, and, above
all, be conducive to strengthening the institutions of democratic participation.

THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK
Part I
These theses all remain intact in this book, and I will make use of them fre
quently. Tn chapter 1,1 will recapitulate the arguments in favor of them, clarify
them in various ways, emphasize how they are illustrated by the competition be
tween agroecological and materialist strategies, and anticipate the conclusions of
later chapters. The other chapters of part I provide arguments complementing
those of SVF and draw further implications from the theses concerning both how
to understand and how to conduct scientific practices. In chapter 2,1 will show
that there need not be conflict between the traditional ideal of scientific objec
tivity and the conduct of scientific inquiry for the sake of furthering social Jus
tice and human well-being. In chapter 3,1 address a gap in the argument of SVF.
My defense of impartiality, which draws on the presupposition that there is a sig
nificant distinction between cognitive and social (ethical and other kinds oO val
ues, has been criticized. In this chapter 1 offer a sustained defense of the impor
tance of the distinction. In the course of doing so, new insights arise about
important methodological issues connected with applications of scientific
knowledge. Distinguishing between the efficacy and legitimacy of proposed ap
plications, and reinforcing the importance of Thesis 10,1 show that legitimacy
depends on endorsing hypotheses (e.g., about risks to human health and the en
vironment, and about the availability of alternative efficacious means to realize
the objective of the application) that lie beyond the purview of research con
ducted under materialist strategies. The significance of this conclusion is made
apparent throughout part II.
In chapter 4 and chapter 5 I explore more fully the implications of the plural
ism that I have proposed. What is the range and variety of strategies that could
or should be developed? I do not attempt to answer this question fully; to do so
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would require a vast number of case studies in fields like psychology, medicine,
and energy policy. I do suggest in chapter 4, however, drawing upon the case
study of agriculture, that a wide range of cultural values may legitimately have
impact on the kinds of strategies that one adopts, so that there are legitimate cul
ture-based variations in approaches to scientific practices. Then, in chapter 5, de
veloping this argument and making use of a detailed account of agroecological
strategies, I consolidate the conclusion that there are rich dialectical links be
tween methodology and application, so much so that it is often impossible to
separate the interpretation of scientific results from the social location in which
the research is conducted. From this, it follows that scientific practices exhibit
historicity: that their character changes, and must change, in fundamental ways
that arise historically, through being responsive to and shaped significantly by
historical and cultural variations in the realm of daily life and experience and in
the structures of social practice.
The arguments I make in part I—for strategic pluralism, for there being (of
ten and legitimately) mutually reinforcing relations between adopting strategies
and holding particular social values, and for the historicity and sociocultural
shaping of scientific practices—are arguments in the philosophy of science.
They draw principally upon my statement of the aim of science (section 3.2) and
my exploration of how to further the manifestation of the widely acclaimed sci
entific ideals of impartiality and neutrality. In order to show that this plurality
represents more than an abstract possibility (Thesis 5), I introduced the case of
agroecological strategies (detailed in section 5.4) as a concrete illustration.
Agroecological strategies are not reducible to materialist strategies, and adopt
ing them has mutually reinforcing relations with holding the values of popular
participation (characterized in section 6.3). The soundness of the argument in
part I does not depend on holding any particular ethical/social values (apart from
those implicit in the aim of science). My highlighting of agroecological strate
gies does reflect my own commitment to the values of popular participation.
This commitment, however, is irrelevant to the appraisal of the fruitfulness of
these strategies; and also the facts that they are not reducible to materialist strate
gies, and that these values contest the modem valuation of control, are irrelevant
to this appraisal.
In part I, the role of agroecological strategies is to provide an example that
shows that there are actual instances of what philosophical analysis identifies to
be possible (a plurality of fmitful strategies). Other strategies, for example, in
the psychological, social, or medical sciences, could have played this role just as
well. In part II, the role of agroecological strategies is essential; knowledge
gained in investigations conducted under them is indispensable for making im
portant ethical judgments about the legitimacy of using transgenics; and devel
opment of the farming practices that agroecological knowledge informs is im
portant for the consolidation of democratic ideals.

Introduction

8

Part II
In part II, drawing on the conclusions of part I, I offer an interpretation of current
controversy about transgenic crops and alternative types of farming such as
agroecology. The controversy is about the legitimacy of research, development,
practical agricultural implementation of transgenics, and practices and policies
(pertaining to transgenics) that currently are being implemented under the spon
sorship principally of agribusiness corporations. I take the pro-transgenics side to
argue for the legitimacy (and importance) of the development, immediate imple
mentation, intensive utilization, and widespread diffusion of transgenics in the
agricultural practices that produce major crops, throughout the world as soon as
possible, and for support for transgenics to become a central plank in national and
international agricultural policies. And I take the con side to deny that the pro
conclusions have been adequately established; to maintain that more research is
needed before a definitive position can be taken; and positively, to prioritize al
ternatives that do not use transgenics, such as agroecology, and the urgency and
priority of investigating their productive potentials.
My interpretation identifies the principal points of contention (while recog
nizing, since there is a variety of opinions in play on both sides, that it involves
a certain amount of idealization). This is a prerequisite to exploring what would
have to be done (if anything can be) to bring about—or to show that there are
insuperable obstacles to bringing about—a resolution of the dispute. It involves
two steps: first, identifying four pairs of contrary propositions that are in dispute
(section . )—pro: P -P and con: Ci-C^; and, second, sketching the valueoutlooks that are implicated, respectively, in the two positions (section 6.3). The
propositions are about strategies for research in agricultural science (discussed
in detail in chapter 7), benefits (chapter ) and risks of using transgenics (chap
ter 9), and whether there are better alternatives (chapter 10):
6 2
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Strategies for Research in Agricultural Science

Pi Developments of transgenics are informed in an exemplary way by scientific
knowledge, that is, they are informed by knowledge gained in research con
ducted under appropriate versions (biotechnological) of materialist strategies;
they are instances of techno-scientific developments, which are the principal
sources of improvements of agricultural practices and (more generally) meet
ing human needs.
C| The kind of knowledge gained under materialist strategies is incomplete and
cannot encompass the possibilities of, for example, sustainable agroecosys
tems and the possible effects of uses of transgenics on the environment, peo
ple, and social arrangements; it is necessary to adopt other strategies in order
to investigate these matters.
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Benefits of Using Transgenics
There are great benefits to be had from using TGs now, and these benefits will
greatly expand with future developments, among which are promised TG
crops with enhanced nutritional qualities that can readily be grown in poor de
veloping countries so that TGs may become key to addressing problems like
those of hunger and malnutrition. When these promises are fulfilled, the ben
efits of TGs will become spread evenhandedly so as (in principle) to serve the
interests and to improve the farming practices of groups holding any viable
value-outlooks.
C The benefits claimed for currently used TGs reflect the ethical/social values
of agribusiness, large-scale farmers, and others who are beneficiaries of the
global market. Furthermore, not only are the benefits relatively slight (per
haps even exaggerated by the proponents), being confined largely to these
groups and not extending to small-scale farmers in the “developing” world (or
to organic farmers in the advanced industrial societies), but also the promises
made about future benefits are not credible, in part because developments of
TGs reflect the interests of the global-market system, the very same system
within which poverty, the fundamental cause of hunger and malnutrition, per
sists today.
2

Risks of the Development and Use of Transgenics
P There are no hazards to human health or the environment arising from the cur
rent and anticipated uses of transgenic crops and their products that pose
risks—of seriousness, magnitude, and probability of occurrence sufficient to
cancel the alleged value of their benefits—that cannot be adequately managed
under responsibly designed regulations.
Cj This claim about risks is not well established scientifically. Moreover, the
greatest risks may not be direct ones to human health and the environment
mediated by biological mechanisms, but those occasioned by the socio
economic context of the research and development of transgenics and their as
sociated mechanisms, such as designating that transgenic seeds are objects to
which intellectual property rights may be granted.
3

Alternative (or "Better") Forms of Farming
P There are no alternative kinds of farming that could be deployed instead of
the proposed transgenic-oriented ways without occasioning unacceptable
risks (e.g., not producing enough food to feed and nourish the world’s grow
ing population), and that reasonably could be expected to produce greater
benefits concerning productivity, sustainability, and meeting human needs—
“transgenics are necessary to feed the world.”
4
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C Agroecological methods (and other alternatives) can be and are being devel
oped that enable high productivity of essential crops (and occasion relatively
less risk); and they promote sustainable agroecosystems, utilize and protect
biodiversity, and contribute to the social emancipation of poor communities.
Furthermore, there is good evidence that they are particularly well suited to
ensure that rural populations in “developing” countries are well fed and nour
ished, so that without their further development current patterns of hunger are
likely to continue.
4

By identifying these as the key points of contention, I hope to have interpreted
the dispute so that a perspicuous contrast is made between the two sides, one that
meets the following conditions: (i) each side can acknowledge that its position
has been fairly represented; (ii) each side is enabled to recognize the internal co
herence of the other, to identify clearly what lies behind the disagreements, and
to raise questions about the evidence and arguments that support the various
propositions; (iii) avenues that might lead to resolution, which are in continuity
with the basic commitments of each side, become opened for exploration.
Iniplications of the Interpretation

Although 1 think that my interpretation meets these conditions, this does not
mean that 1 abstain from taking positions on the propositions. There is good
reason —1 will argue, again with grounding in the conclusions of part I—to en
dorse C| (methodological pluralism) (chapter 7), that now
and
lack the
support that they need in order to play their role in arguments legitimating uses
of transgenics (chapter 9 and chapter 10, respectively), and that there is ur
gency to conduct research relevant to test the limits of the promise of alterna
tive agricultural methods, expressed in
(chapter 10). That is enough to deny
legitimacy at the present time to projects aimed at the widespread implemen
tation of transgenic-oriented agriculture throughout the world. But it also is
part of my argument that the legitimacy of the transgenics project in the long
run depends on the outcomes of testing the limits of
(section 10.4), so that
using my interpretive framework does not guarantee that the opponents of
transgenics will be vindicated in the long run.
The interpretive framework sets up a context in which empirical investigation,
conducted under a plurality of strategies (including agroecological ones), could
play a major role in cutting through the disagreements about risks (P3/C3) and al
ternative types of farming (PyC^). Conducting this kind of research would in
form ethical deliberation in two ways, by providing knowledge (a) for apprais
ing presuppositions of the legitimacy of using transgenics on a wide scale at the
present time, and (b) for informing agroecological innovations that are impor
tant for bringing about greater manifestation of the values of popular participa
tion. Thus, engaging in research conducted under agroecological strategies is
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likely, because of (a), to further the manifestation of impartiality and, because of
(b), of neutrality; and so, adopting strategies, which have mutually reinforcing
relations with the values of popular participation, is likely to contribute to the
furtherance of acclaimed scientific interests. According to my interpretation, the
con argument is not an abstract one, and it does not involve merely negative crit
icism of mainstream science, since it is also rooted in critical reflection on the
practices of agroecology. It enables a positive case to be made for the scientific
significance of the knowledge that informs agroecological practices and for the
value of research that strengthens them. It is part of a philosophical perspective
that interprets and supports both the practices and the research conducted to in
form them (as having a proper place—alongside others—within scientific prac
tices), and it defends their credentials from criticisms that they are “unscien
tific.” So it is an interpretation that confronts the predominant self-image of
contemporary science with the sound claims of an alternative practice. The
strength of the argument goes hand in hand with the value and viability of the
alternative practices.
Does the Authority of Science Provide
Backing for the Pro Transgenics Side?
I said that I wanted an interpretation in which each side would acknowledge the
portrayal made of it. I have taken seriously the pro side’s claim to have the
backing of science. Obviously developments of transgenics are products of re
search conducted under materialist (biotechnological, molecular biological)
strategies, and their efficacy (within certain domains) has been confirmed by
this research. In addition, I take the pro side to claim scientific backing for the
key propositions about risks and alternatives that are important for legitimating
uses of transgenics. I argue (chapter 9; chapter 10) that at the present time there
is not strong empirical backing for P, and P^, since relevant inquiries (that I
specify)—requiring the use of a plurality of strategies—pertaining to risk have
not been conducted, and others pertaining to alternatives have effectively been
ignored. But, by endorsing P,, the pro side tends to identify scientific research
with research conducted under materialist strategies, and so it does not recog
nize the possibility (and, in this case, necessity) of scientific research con
ducted under a plurality of strategies. (Thus, it tends to interpret the con side as
“unscientific” or even “antiscientific.”) I will suggest that endorsing Pj is a
consequence of holding the modern valuation of control and endorsing its pre
suppositions (section 9.2); then the absence of strong empirical backing for P^
and P^ (and accepting that there is a strong presumption in their favor) derives,
not from scientific evidence, but in part from a value commitment, that has pre
suppositions (e.g., that techno-scientific solutions can be found for virtually all
socially significant problems, and that there are no significant possibilities for
value-outlooks, not incorporating the modern valuation of control, to be actu-
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alized in the foreseeable future—section 1.1) that themselves cannot be inves
tigated under materialist strategies.
At the same time as the pro side claims the backing of the authority of science,
it also represents the interests of leading institutions of capital and the market
that dominate the world economy today. Another way to look at its endorsement
of P|, and its endorsement of the presuppositions of the modern valuation of con
trol, is that they derive from endorsing that there are no significant (valued) pos
sibilities for the foreseeable future outside of the trajectory of the institutions of
capital and the market. Then (section 10.6), the pro argument could be strength
ened, since it would appear to marginalize the relevance of Cj and C^, by re
placing with P^a:
P^a; There are no alternative kinds of farming—wit/im the trajectory of the
socioeconomic system based on capital and the market—that could be de
ployed instead of the proposed TG-oriented ways without occasioning unac
ceptable risks (e.g., not producing enough food to feed and nourish the
world’s growing population), and that reasonably could be expected to pro
duce greater benefits concerning productivity, sustainability, and meeting hu
man needs; and outside of this trajectory there are no genuinely realizable
agricultural possibilities.
P^a may be taken to express a political-economic commitment and, given the
constraints it states, empirical research might contribute to vindicate it; and,
given the economic and political power linked with it, it might be expedient sim
ply to dismiss the con side as a nuisance. Then the authority of science would be
subordinated to the political values and power embodied in this trajectory. Al
ternatively, the pro side might claim to endorse P^a on empirical grounds and, in
this way, to reclaim the authority of science. Clearly the con side would oppose
it on both counts.
Part III
In the public debates about transgenics, the pro side often moves imperceptibly
back and forth between P^ and P^a. Responding to P^, the con side emphasizes
the fruitfulness of research conducted under agroecological strategies and the
promise of agroecological approaches to farming; responding to P^a, it affirms
the viability of the movements that embody the values of popular participation
and their potential to grow with a trajectory that could nurture new kinds of so
cial structures. Thus, for the con side, the development of research conducted
under agroecological strategies, the development and improvement of agroeco
logical farming, and the activities and growth of movements that embody the
values of popular participation are inseparably linked.
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These considerations all raise the question of how propositions like P^a, the
presuppositions of the modem valuation of control, and other questions about
future social possibilities—as well as the various contrary propositions that
would be affirmed by the con side—can be investigated in a systematic empiri
cal way. Under what kinds of (social science) strategies would the investigations
have to be conducted? The answer to this question, and the outcomes of the re
search, are relevant to attempts to resolve the controversies about transgenics in
ways that make use of the input of scientific (systematic empirical) investigation
to the utmost. Those with power on their side have not waited for an answer be
fore going ahead with the rapid and widespread introduction of transgenics; con
sequently the con side often finds itself in a negative reactive mode, opposing
what is happening. That should not obscure the continuing importance of inves
tigating further the promise contained in C^. Evidence for directly challenges
the empirical credentials of P^, but it also remains important that there be move
ments that challenge P^a. The possibility of manifesting values like those of pop
ular participation to a greater degree depends on there being genuine alternative
practices (in agriculture as well as other areas) that may reflect these values, and
the latter depends on social and political action that claims and gains more and
expanding spaces for these practices, expansion that is not possible without suc
cessfully challenging P^a.
In the brief part III, I begin to entertain questions about how to investigate fu
ture social possibilities. I do just enough to make clear that the conclusions of
part I, especially those about strategic pluralism and mutually reinforcing rela
tions between adopting strategies and holding values, will play an important role
in answering them. I can do no more than this within the scope of this book.

